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FOREWORD 
A major component of IIASA's Technology-Economy-Society 
(TES) Program is a project to assess "Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing" (CIM), by which is meant the whole range of 
application of computers to discrete parts manufacturing and 
assembly. The various familiar acronyms and buzzwords, such as 
NC, CNC, DNC, CAD/CAM robotics, FMS, "group technology" and MRP 
all fit under the broad CIM umbrella. The present paper is the 
first to be generated, at least in part, under the project. (In 
fact, an earlier draft was written while the author was at 
Carnegie-Mellon University). The paper presents some interesting 
and new ideas about the nature of the forces driving the 
worldwide trend toward flexible automat ion. I t  suggests, in 
brief, that the demand for CIM arises from what Nathan Rosenberg 
has termed as "mismatch", i.e. a problem that was created, in 
effect, by technological progress itself. In this case the 
"problem" is that defects in manufacturing have become 
intolerable. The reason for that is that demand for higher and 
higher levels of product performance, over many decades, has 
required orders-of-magnitude increases in mechanical complexity, 
on the one hand, and higher precision, on the other. To satisfy 
these high standards requires a level of error control that 
increasingly precludes the use of human workers in direct contact 
with workpieces as they move through the manufacturing system. 
This working paper is being made available more widely to 
stimulate discussion and comment. We hope that it will succeed 
in that regard. 
Thomas H. Lee 
Project Leader, 
Technology, Economy, Society 
COMPLEXITY, RELIABILITY AND DESIGN: 
THE COMING MONOLITHIC REVOLUTION IN MANUFACTURING 
Robert U. Ayres 
According to the poet Alexander Pope "to err is human; to 
forgive divine". rhis may be a truism in the moral sphere, but 
it is only half true in the production context. Modern 
manufacturing, in particular, is unforgiving of error. Exact 
figures are lacking, but a surprisingly large fraction of the 
cost of production is directly attributable either to the 
prevention of avoidable defects (e.g. quality control), their 
detection (e.g. inspection), or their elimination after the fact 
(repair, rework). A survey carried out by Quality (June 1977, p. 
20) over 10 U.S. manufacturing industries found that total 
quality costs (inspection, scrap, rework and warranty) averaged 
5.8% of sales. The importance of this figure is doubled when one 
considers that roughly 50% of the sales dollar goes for purchased 
materials which also include a quality cost component. From 
another perspective, the celebrated Japanese superiority over the 
U.S. in manufacturing may stem largely from a longer established 
Japanese recognition of this problem coupled with widespread 
commitment to ameliorate it.=. In this paper I will explore five 
related hypotheses, as follows: 
- that the human "error rate" is inherently large and cannot 
be reduced to (or nearly to) zero even under the most 
favorable conditions -- although clever human factors 
engineering can often achieve substantial improvements over 
existing rates in given cases. Nevertheless, human workers 
are not improving rapidly (if at all) in terms of their 
prospensity to make mistakes on the job; 
- that "high performance in a product tends to require a high 
degree of precision and complexity in the design and 
'Xerox corporation offers an interesting example. Recently 
Xerox announced with some pride that its parts reject rate is now 
down to 1.3 per thousand (from 8 per thousand a few years ago). 
However, its Japanese competitors have achieved reject rates less 
than 1 per thousand (N.Y. Times, November 16, 1985). Since the 
early 70's when its exclusive patent protection expired, Xerox's 
market share of the plain paper copier market has fallen to about 
36% while Japanese companies like Ricoh and Canon totally 
dominate the low-cost segment of the market. A recent study of 
the room airconditioner industry found even more startling 
differences: Japanese firms achieved assembly line defect rates 
almost 70 times lower than U.S. firms, on the average, while 
among U.S. firms there was a best-to-worst range of 7 per 100 to 
165 per 100 (Garvin 1983). The best Japanese producers achieved 
failure rates between 500 and 1000 times better than the worst 
U.S. producers (ibid). 
manufacturing process. This tendency can be seenmost 
clearly over time; 
- that as precision increases and the production system 
becomes more complex and more interrelated the cost of 
information required for controlling the manufacturing 
process as a whole has been growing geometrically. The cost 
of discovering and/or eliminating defects, in particular, 
seems to increase as a non-linear function of product 
complexity and diversity; 
- that defects can be thought of as lost information (just as 
errors in accounts or messages) and that error-detection and 
error-correction techniques from communications theory may 
be appropriate tools for management; 
- that defects can best be eliminated in manufacturing by 
adopting the 'monolithic' concept that has been so 
successful in electronics. 
2. The Intrinsic Human Error Probablilty 
Ergonomists and human factors engineers have traditionally 
approached the "error" problem in terms of "explaining" errors by 
machine operators in terms of poorly designed man-machine 
interfaces. Their focus has been largely on redesigning this 
interface to increase system reliability. This is understandable 
and desirable but tends to obscure a key fact: that even with the 
best designed man-machine interface, the probability of human 
error cannot in practice be reduced to zero except, possibly, by 
decreasing the rate of useful output to zero also. Among the 
fundamental reasons why humans are inherently error-prone is the 
inability to maintain a permanent state of concentrated 
attention. Subconscious, autonomous processes are necessary for 
the functioning of the organism. Heart and lung operation are 
only two examples. Limbs must move or twitch from time to time 
or they will cramp. Eyes must 'blink' occasionally to maintain 
external lubrication, itches must be scratched, throats must be 
cleared, etc., etc. These biophysical functions occasionally 
interfere with conscious mental activities and cause lapses in 
attention. 
Factors that tend to increase the error-rate above the 
theoretical minimum rate are known to include: 
- emotional stress 
- physical strain and discomfort 
- interference (noise) 
- poor illumination 
- information load (overload). 
The influence of these factors on human performance and 
error rate is discussed in a number of ergonomics and human 
factors monographs and research reports such as CMeister 711, 
CMeister 761, and [Swain 831. 
The general relationship between information processed 
(input) and information transmitted (output) has been discussed 
extensively in the ergonomics and psychology literature, 
especially in the context of estimating maximum output rates. 
From Figures 1 and 2 ,  especially, it can be seen that as the 
input ratez increases, the amount of information "lost" -- which 
is equivalent to the error rate -- rises extremely sharply as the 
input rate approaches 10 bits/sec. This can be interpreted, 
without straining the facts, as a straightforward problem of 
overload, or saturation. This would seem to offer a partial 
explanation, at least, of the extremely high propensity of humans 
to make errors in emergency situations, noted by Swain S Guttmann 
Cop citl. 
A representative table of nominal human error probabilities 
for or HEPys for operating manual controls is shown in Table 1. 
These figures are to be interpreted as the medians of log normal 
distributions of experimental subjects. (50% of subjects would 
have a higher HEP, 50% would have a lower HEP.) The range of 
uncertainty of the distribution is called the error factor (EF). 
It is significant that the lowest HEP shown is .0005 
corresponding to 5 errors per 10,000 decisions. IYodifiers for 
HEP's are shown in Table 2. Note that modifiers are always 
greater than unity. Thus the nominal HEPys can be interpreted as 
practical minimum median error rates for represenative 
populations. It is unlikely that the figures would vary 
significantly from one country to another, for instance. 
Implications of these data for manufacturing management and 
automation are discussed in subsequent sections. 
3. Precision, Complexity and Performance 
With regard to the second hypothesis -- that high 
performance demands precision and complexity -- a few random 
examples will have to suffice to make the point, since no scholar 
(to my knowledge) has ever explored the question in depth. 
Indeed, the proposition becomes almost self-evident from the 
superficial examination of early machines. Invariably, they are 
quite simple and crude by comparison to their modern 
counterparts. One early weight-driven clock, for instance, 
utilized 8 gear wheels, an escape wheel, a crank ( 3  parts) a 
foliot balance ( 5  parts), a verge (3 parts), 6 axles, 2 pointer 
hands, a face plate, and various frame parts, pins, etc. CStrandh 
791. Later versions introduced second-hands, adjustment 
mechanisms, self-winding mechanisms, chimes or alarms, calendars, 
jewel-bearings or ball-bearings, and so on. Surface tolerances 
for early clock parts were seldom better than 1:100, and time- 
keeping accuracy was correspondingly low. By contrast modern 
mass-produced electronic watches achieve time-keeping precision 
"The input rate in Figure 1 is shown in alphabetical symbols 
per second, where each symbol is equivalent to roughly 3 bits of 
information. 
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Figure 1. Information Troughput vs. Speed for Typing. 
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C i t e d  by Miller 78. 
Figure 2. Information Processing by Humans. 
Table 1. Estimated Probabilities of Errors of Commission in 
Operating Manual Controls* 
ltem Potential Errors 
Human Error Error 
Probability Factor 
HEP (Range) 
(1 Inadvertent activation o f  a control 
Select wrong control on  a panel f r om an array o f  
similar-appearing controls: 
identified by labels only 
arranged in well-delineated functional groups 
which are part o f  a well-defined mimic layout 
Turn rotary control in wrong direction ( fo r  two-  
position switches, see ltem 8): 
when there is n o  violation o f  populational 
stereotypes 
when design violates a strong populational 
stereotype and operating conditions are 
normal 
when design violates a strong populational 
stereotype and operation is under high 
stress 
Turn a two-position switch in wrong direction or 
leave it in the wrong setting 
Set a rotary control t o  an incorrect setting 
( for  two-position switches, see ltem 8) 
The HEPs are for errors o f  commission only and do not include any errors of  decision as to  whtch controls t o  acttvate. 
. . 
Dtvide HEPs l o r  rotary controls (I tems 5-71 by  5 lure same EFsI. 
... 
Thls error is  a function o f  the c la r i t y  w i t h  which indtcator pos i t ion can be determined designs of  control knobs and their 
Posit ion ind~cat ions vary greatly. For plant-specif ic analyses, an EF of 3 may be used. 
Table 1. (continued) 
Human Factor Error 
Probability Factor 
Item Potential Errors HEP (Range) , 
(101 Failure to complete change of state of a 
component if switch must be held until change 
is completed .003 3 
Select wrong circuit breaker in a group of 
circuit breakers: 
densely grouped and identified by labels only 
in which the PSFs are more favorable 
( 1 3) Improperly mate a connector (this includes 
failures to seat connectors completely and 
failure to test locking features of connectors 
for engagement) .003 3 
Table 2. Modifiers for HEP's* 
Stress Level 
Very low 
(Very low task load) 
Optimum 
(Optimum task load): 
Dynamict 
Moderately high 
(Heavy task load): 
Step-by-stept 
Dynamict 
Extremely High 
(Threat stress) 
Dynamict 
Diagnosistt .25 (EF = 5)  .50 (EF = 5 )  
These are the actual HEPs 
to use with dynamic tasks 
or diagnosis - they are 
N(3T modifiers. 
-
MA skilled person is one with 6 months or more experience in the tasks being assessed. 
A novice is one with less than 6 months or more experience. 
tStep-by-step tasks are routine, procedurally guided tasks, such as carrying out written 
calibration procedures. Dynamic tasks require a higher degree o f  man-machine 
interaction, such as decision-making, keeping track o f  several functions, controlling 
several functions, or any combination o f  these. These requirements are the basis o f  the 
distinction between step-by-step tasks and dynamic tasks, which are of ten involved in 
responding t o  an abnormal event 
TtDiagnosis may be carried out under varying degrees o f  stress, ranging f r om low 
(optimum) t o  extremely high (threat stress). For threat stress, the HEP o f  .25 is used t o  
estimate performance of an ind iv idua l .  
of the order of 1:106 or even better. This level of performance 
obviously requires a correspondingly high order of precision in 
the manufacturing process. 
Tools provide another illustration. Early hand tools such 
as hammers, tongs, or shears typically involved 2 or 3 parts. A 
late 19th century hand-drill (brace and bit) with a chuck 
accommodating various drill bit diameters involves 20 parts. A 
push-type hand-held screw-dr iver with an ad justable chuck 
utilizes 30 or more parts. The addition of an electric drive 
motor would, of course, add another 50 or so. A hand-saw had 3-5 
parts. A motor driven chain-saw of current vintage has several 
hundred parts. Moreover, each of those is made with a level of 
precision in terms of composition and surface finish far beyond 
capabilities of even 19th century manufacturers. 
Vehicles provide the clearest evidence of the trend toward 
precision combined with complexity. Horse drawn taxicabs of the 
mid-19th century consisted of a springless chassis with an 
enclosed body for the passengers, 2 doors and a simple bench for 
the driver, two iron axles, solid iron sleave-type bearings, four 
relatively simple spoked wheels, and tiller-type of steering 
mechanisms. The wheels were already moderately sophisticated, 
with 8-12 spokes and steel rims. The introduction of the safety 
bicycle in 1885 was a quantum leap in several areas, including 
the lightweight wheel, gearshift, chain-sprocket drive and 
ball-bearings. Each of these devices is highly complex. Thus an 
1885 Rover safety bicycle required more than 500 individual 
parts. 
The earliest motorized vehicles (Benz, 1886) added a small 
1-cylinder gasoline engine with a chain and sprocket drive 
mechanisms to a 3-wheeled carriage using bicycle wheels":'. Benz's 
1-cylinder engine was a direct adaptation of Otto's successful 
spark-ignition gas engine (1876) for gasoline. In 1893 Maybach 
invented the carburetor. The steering wheel replaced the ti 1 ler 
after 1901 and the steering knuckle followed in 1902. 
Differential gears were introduced to allow the rear wheels to 
turn at different speeds. 
Other features adding greater convenience, power or ability 
-- at the price of added complexity -- included the pneumatic 
tire (now very complex product in itself), springs and shock 
absorbers, multi-cylinder engines, the electric self-starter, 
acetylene headlamps followed by electric headlights, batteries, 
dashboard instruments, more controls -- such as the throttles and 
chokes -- water cooling, forced feed lubrication, mechanically 
operated valves, magneto's (later generators and alternators), 
hydraulic brakes, synchromesh transmission (1914) -- later 
followed by automatic transmission--, safety glass, power brakes, 
power steering, radio, air conditioning, emission controls, and 
so on. 
"One later simplification was the introduction of pressed 
solid metal wheels, in place of complex bicycle type wheels. 
This became possible due to the development of new metal-working 
processes. 
In fact, the modern car is an extraordinarily complex piece 
of machinery, involving roughly 20,000 component parts. Of 
these, only a few percent are actually manufactured by auto 
companies themselves.'+ As many as 30% of the total number are 
electrical or electronic, and this percent is rising rapidly. 
Most parts have at least 3 distinct surfaces, while many parts 
(including threaded connectors) have 8-10 surfaces. A few parts 
like gear-wheels, pistons, crankshaft, and camshaft have a large 
number of surfaces. Thus a car probably has 60,000 to 80,000 
distinct 'oriented' surfaces. Yet autos are relatively simple 
compared to aircraft, helicopters, diesel-electric locomotives, 
transfer lines, electric generating plants, computers and other 
capital goods. The space shuttle is probably the apogee of 
mechanical complexity (with unfortunate consequences, as will be 
seen). Quite apart from the large number of distinct parts in a 
complex modern product, a manufacturer today typically offers a 
large number of different models of each basic item. For 
example, Westinghouse Electric Company manufactures over 50,000 
different steam turbine blade shapes alone. A large turbine 
involves 350,000 parts. A major electrical connector manufacturer 
(AMP) produces 80,000 different connector models. The IBM 
Sele~tric'-~ typewriter had 2,700 parts, and could be made in 
55,000 different models. 
4. Complexity, Errors and Defects 
It is axiomatic among industrial engineers that "product 
defects, failures, and accidents are invariably the result of 
human error... Since the worker is merely part of the production 
system, which has been consciously and deliberately designed, it 
stands to reason that those who designed the system are 
responsible for any inadequacies occurring in it." CMeister 821. 
This view, of course, puts enormous emphasis on human factors and 
systems engineering. The role of human factors engineering is 
undoubtedly important and often underrated. Indeed, human error 
probability (HEP) for a given activity in a given situation can 
often be sharply reduced from current levels, at modest cost, by 
eliminating certain factors that tend to increase errors. On the 
other hand, the claim (ibid) "that errors can always be 
eliminated by better systems design" is not scientifically 
justified, except in the special case where human workers are 
eliminated. The basic reason is that the human worker himself is 
not subject to redesign. Hence any system involving human 
workers is inherently subject to human limitations. 
It was pointed out previously that human workers are 
intrinsically prone to errors. The major justification for 
automatic computation from Charles Babbage's time onward, is the 
fact that mathematical tables computed by humans are notoriously 
full of errors (mostly of transcription). According to one 
'.+Virtually all of the simple parts (bearings, pistons, rings 
and fasteners) are purchased, as well as most electrical parts, 
rubber, glass and many complex subassemblies like brakes, 
transmission, hydraulics and emission controls. 
historian of computers, speaking of Babbage's motivation: 
"None of these tables could be trusted, and many an 
experiment was undermined when the scientist discovered an 
error in a table he had relied on. One writer of the time, 
Dionysius Lardner, discovered that mistakes originally 
committed by European mathematicians in 1603 cropped up 200 
years later in Chinese manuscripts. Government tables used 
for accurate navigation had more than 1100 errors and seven 
folio pages of corrections. The corrections needed 
corrections". CShurkin 1985, p. 231. 
The problem only got worse, as mathematical tables were needed 
for more and more purposes. In the 1930's the WPA tabulated many 
mathematical functions (using people with hand calculators) but 
these tables were full of errors--mostly mistakes in copying. 
The tables were later recalculated by Howard Aiken's Mark I 
Electromechanical computer, to eliminate these errors CBrooks, 
19861. Recent Department of Defense studies indicate an average 
of one error per 300 manual data entries. By comparison, optical 
scanners reading bar codes make one error per 3,000,000 entries 
CMcKenney & McFarlan 82, p. 1093. Roughly speaking, electronics 
technology is now on the order of five orders of magnitude less 
error-prone than human workers. 
There is no experimental evidence, nor any theoretical 
reason to suppose that the human error probability (HEP) can ever 
be reduced to zero (or even very close to zero) in any practical 
case. Indeed, Meister himself remarks (inconsistently) that 
"errors are inevitable unless there are no tolerance limits" (op. 
cit.). In repetitive jobs involving simple decisions of the 
yes/no type the minimum human error probability (HEP) appears to 
be of the order of lo"'-=. In other words, the error rate 
generally exceeds 1 per 1000 opportunities.!' HEP may be much 
greater if working conditions are not ideal. However, I will not 
further explore the relationships between various aspects of 
working conditions and HEP, except to recall that experiments 
show that the error rate begins to rise rapidly as information 
output approaches about 8 bits/sec. To achieve a low HEP, other 
factors being favorable the information processing load must be 
kept well below the workers capacity -- probably well below 2-3 
bi ts/sec. 
Of course, many errors in manufacturing are caught by 
multi-layer inspection systems. An average human-based system 
will catch and eliminate 70% - 80% of the defects per inspection. 
With a hierarchy of several inspection systems, the probability 
of a defect being undetected can be reduced to perhaps 2 in 100, 
giving a theoretically achievable final rate (for defects 
embodied in the product) of the order of lo*--". Of course this is 
=This number comes from a recent publication summarizing the 
literature [Swain 831. An earlier book by Swain suggested the 
range lo'--" - lo"-" for HEP. Evidently recent evidence tends 
toward the larger figure. However, to be conservative the lower 
figures should be considered as a (remote) possibility. 
very low as compared with defect rate of - lo'-" currently. 
Nevertheless, it is not low enough as will be seen. 
Also, it must be recognized that, because of design 
redundancies and other factors, most (70% - 80%) defects don't 
matter much. For instance, spot welders in auto body plants are 
expected to make a certain number of bad welds. To compensate for 
this, designers simply provide for more welds than would 
otherwise be necessary. (Robot welders are more reliable than 
human workers and plants using robots can design for about 10% 
fewer welds). Hence the critical defect rate would be somewhat 
lower than the basic defect rate. 
All things considered it seems possible that critical 
undetected defect rates might be reduced to the order of lo"-" 
(.0001) or perhaps even lo""." (.000001). But these rates are 
hypothetical. They are far lower than actual current industrial 
performance. (A "good" reject rate today is around 0.1% or 1 per 
thousand ) . Nevertheless the costs of overdesign (or "gold- 
plating"),&- multiple layers of inspection, debugging, rework, 
maintenance and -- above all -- the heavy costs associated with 
catastrophic parts failures that occur after a product is in 
service -- make human errors increasingly intolerable in 
manufacturing. A 5.8% direct cost percentage was cited earlier, 
but this is only the tip of the iceberg. When the burocratic 
structures and accounting procedures made necessary by the 
tendency of humans to err are also considered, the 'real' cost of 
error control in a modern manufacturing firm may be much higher. 
This problem is particularly burdensome where high levels of 
product performance are desired, requiring high degrees of 
complexity in the product design, or in mass production 
situations. 
According to Meister (op. cit.), the Ford Motor Company 
alone provides about 3 billion opportunities for human error per 
day in assembly operations alone. Even in the most optimistic 
case -- assuming a probability of undetected serious error of 1 
per million opportunities -- Ford would have to expect about 3000 
undetected serious production flaws per day. The actual number of 
defects in autos is surely much larger under present (far from 
ideal) conditions. 
The dilemma faced by manufacturers of complex products can 
perhaps be understood more clearly from a simplified "model" of 
the production process. Suppose the final product involves 
components of N distinct part types, each which involves a 
sequence of unit operations. The total number of actual 
operations involved is, therefore, 
"The high costs associated with overdesign are particularly 
evident in military procurement. So-cal lled "military 
specifications" (or mil specs) typically lead to unit costs from 
10 to 100 times greater than comparable products designed for the 
civilian market. Yet military hardware is notoriously 
unreliable. This is surely attributable to the attempt to 
achieve maximum possible performance which, in turn, leads to 
extraordinary complexity of design. 
where n, ic, the number of components of the ic'" part type and mt 
is the number of unit operations needed to produce the it;" part 
type- Each unit operation is an opportunity for error and a 
decision point where a hypothetical inspector makes a yes/no 
decision. ("Yes" means the operation was carried out correctly, 
while "no" means it was not). If the result of the inspection is 
positive -- "yes" -- the workpiece presumably moves on to the 
next operation. If the results of the inspection are negative -- 
1 1 ~ ~ -  - the workpiece is presumably rejected and discarded or 
diverted into a "rework" line of some sort. 
Suppose the a priori probability of error in the j'"-' unit 
operation of the i e h  branch (or part type) is known to be p,,. 
We can assume p,, is a small number, of the order of ICY"-=. 
Asssuming perfectly reliable inspectors,' the a priori 
probability of a "yes" at the ijeh inspection point is ( 1  - p,,). 
The probability of making one flawless component of the i c h  type, 
with no parts rejections or need for rework is, therefore, 
where ui is the probability of making the i e h  part successfully. 
I t  follows that the probability u of manufacturing the 
components flawlessly is 
For purposes of argument, suppose that there is a lower limit on 
pI,, viz. 
7 S pi, for all i, j 
It follows immediately that 
for all i ,  j and, therefore, the probability achieving "zero 
defects" is bounded 
70bviously, the real situation is much less favorable! 
where M is defined by equation ( 1 ) .  
Now (6) can be approximated in two different limiting cases, 
depending on the product M q ,  the number of "opportunities" for an 
error times the a priori probability of an error per opportunity. 
But if Mq << 1 
In words, if opportunity -times- probability of error 
significantly exceeds unity, the probability of achieving a 
product with "zero defects" (without many layers of inspections 
and rejections and much rework) is essentially nil. Consequently 
quality control and rework must inevitably constitute a large 
fraction of the costs of any complex product. Since inspection 
itself is subject to human error, complex systems manufactured, 
maintained and operated by humans are statistically certain to 
fail with some regularity. (The reliability problems of the U.S. 
space shuttle illustrate this point perfectly). 
The production system can be regarded as a noisy channel of 
communication where the final product (or service) is, of course, 
the "message". Errors in manufacturing certainly constitute a 
kind of information loss or "noise". Humans ar.e obviously the 
major source of noise in the system. The reduction or elimination 
of channel noise effectively adds useful information to the 
"message". Since the number of inspection points (error 
possibilities) is defined as M (Equation I ) ,  it follows that the 
number of possible erroneous versions of the message is 2M. 
Hence, the selection of one "correct" version requires exactly 
bits of information per unit of final production. 
Taking a clue from communications engineering, there are two 
possible strategies for increasing the signal to noise ratio and 
ensuring correct transmission of the desired message through a 
noisy channel. One strategy is to reduce the intrinsic noise 
level in the channel (e.9. by cooling it). The other is to code 
the transmission in such a way as to increase redundancy. In 
fact, it is relatively easy to design codes to automatically 
reveal (i.e. detect) certain classes of common input/output 
errors, such as transpositions. With slightly more 
sophistication, errors once detected can also be corrected 
automatically with a known (and fairly high) probability of 
success. 
Both of these strategies are applicable in manufacturing. 
The first (noise reduction) strategy is primarily accomplished by 
removing humans from tool-wielding and direct operational control 
over machines. Computers using solid-state electronic circuitry 
are far more reliable than humans in the sense of having an a 
priori probability of error per opportunity much lower than 
humans. The worldwide trend towards automation can be regarded as 
an implementation of this strategy. The second (coding) strategy 
must be accomplished through product design. "Design for 
manufacturability" is nearly a cliche. However, just as coding 
can make many types of transmission errors self-revealing, many 
types of manufacturing errors reveal themselves automatically in 
the assembly stage. Of course, this is not a very clever 
solution. It is far cleverer to find and weed out defects as 
soon as they occur in the process. Monitoring and screening 
devices of many kinds can be devised to react automatically to 
flaws of predictable types. It is part of the system designer's 
function to design for easy error detection. 
5. Complexity and Optimization 
The evident trend toward product complexity on the one hand, 
and model diversity on the other hand, also puts great stress on 
management. Just keeping track of parts inventories and 
suppliers is becoming an enormous task for large manufacturers. 
For example, Caterpillar Tractor Company does business with 
25,000 different suppliers, worldwide. This number could well be 
dwarfed by comparable figures for General Electric, IBM or 
General  motor^.^^ The problem on the product distribution side is 
equally formidable (and less well understood), because demand 
patterns can change very quickly. Manufacturers are in a 
position as difficult as that of banks, which have to obtain 
their funds from short-term depositors while making risky 
long-term commitments. Manufacturers of consumer products today 
must make comparatively long-term commitments to their own 
suppliers, while responding to short-term changes in their own 
markets. This puts increasing emphasis on managerial and 
manufacturing flexibility. 
'31t was reported recently, however, that Xerox Corp. has cut 
the number of its suppliers from 5,000 to 300, in order to work 
more closely with each of them (New York Times, November, 1985). 
Generalities aside, it is arguable that the information 
processing requirements associated with efficient manufacturing 
increase much faster than complexity/diversity per se. The 
evidence supporting this conclusion will be reviewed hereafter. 
The implications are worth stating clearly now: unaided human 
intelliqence is increasinqly inadequate for purposes of selectinq 
optimal or near optimal manufacturinq strateqies, qiven the 
enormous ranae of choices to be made. These include: long-term 
business strategy, (what business are we in?) marketing strategy 
(e.9. mass v. custom) ; product design strategy (performance, 
reliability, finish price); materials choice; make v. buy 
decisions for each component; supplier selection; supplier 
relationship (long-term v. short term) mfg. strategy (location, 
scale, process choice); assembly strategy; distribution strategy; 
maintenance and customer support strategy. The choices to be 
made are interdependent, as well as being functions of the state 
of technology, financial constraints (interest rates, debt v. 
equity, liquidity, current profitability, etc.). Many managers 
believe that the inherent complexity of these higher level 
decisions is such that only human judgment can ultimately be 
relied on. It is arguable, however, that the complexity is so 
great that (unaided) human judgement is almost inevitably 
inadequate. I mean that obvious or traditional choices are 
likely to turn out to be siqnificantly inferior to optimal 
choices that might (in principle) be found with enough help from 
computers and artificial intelligence ( 6 . 1 . ) .  
It is not possible to examine each of the above-mentioned 
sub-optimization problems in any detail. In keeping with the 
primary focus of this paper, I will consider only the physical 
aspects of parts manufacturing and assembly. Figure 3 outlines 
schematically the processes of design, manufacturing and assembly 
as it might conceivably be organized in the future CDeFazio & 
Whitney 831. The two boxes marked by asterisks represent tasks 
of considerable difficulty that are currently carried out 
manually, and probably will be for some time to come. Until now 
relatively little research has been done on devising systematic 
methodologies or "algorithms" for determining assembly order, and 
parts transport and feeding technologies. 
The corresponding problem for parts manufacturing strategy 
is to select parts forming processes and sequences, and to layout 
the machines on the plant floor for efficient scheduling. This 
problem has been approached more or less systematically since 
1967 when Opitz COpitz 671 introduced a geometrical parts code 
(Figure 4 ) .  This code permits rapid computerized sorting of 
parts by shape, size, material and other characteristics and 
matching to approximate machines. It also permits grouping of 
parts based on geometrical similarities. In some cases existing 
parts can be found that preclude the need to design new ones. 
More commonly, new parts can be developed by identifying similar 
existing ones and modifying them appropriately. For 
manufacturing purposes, groups of geometrically similar parts 
correspond to machine groupings. 
"Group technology", as it has come to be known, is 
essentially an information processing system for systematizing 
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design and manufacturing choices. General benefits are claimed 
in terms of both planning and implementations. With regard to 
the choice of process sequence the two aspects converge and 
interfere since the matching parts to machines (planning) is 
constrainted by machine availability (implementation). Machine 
availability is, of course, determined by scheduling. The 
production schedule, in turn, governs raw materials requirements. 
The nature and difficulty of the optimization problem 
emerges more clearly from the consideration that two management 
objectives are clearly in conflict. On the one hand it is 
desirable to maximize the effective utilization of all capital 
equipment, especially the most expensive machines such as CNC 
milling centers.'? On the other hand, it is desirable to minimize 
the number and value of parts in the "work in progress" 
inventory. It is fairly obvious that machine utilization can be 
increased in general by using idle machines to build parts 
inventory. On the other hand, work-in-progress can be reduced 
essentially to zero, but only by having a large enough inventory 
of machines such that no part ever has to wait for a machine to 
become available. Since both machines and work-in-progress 
represent real capital, the true optimum (disregarding other 
constraints) is obviously some compromise between these extremes. 
Assuming the machines inventory is fixed (in the short term) the 
variable factor is the length of the queue of work-in-progress. 
A pure optimum solution would be characterized by at least one 
machine being 100% utilized--a "bottleneckm--while the rest are 
idle to variable degrees. 
The above problem can be solved in principle by integer- 
programming techniques, for a given machine inventory and product 
mix. The problem is far more difficult to solve if parts mix 
demand is variable and uncertain and machines can break down at 
random intervals. Nevertheless, existing mathematical 
programming and simulation techniques for planning, packaged as 
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP) systems are now 
commercially available yielding significant improvements in 
overall capital utilization. Even so, the optimum capital 
utilization rate will tend to be fairly low in batch production 
situations where product diversity is high and production rates 
are comparative1 y low. 
With regard to the "amount" of information processing needed 
as a function of the complexity of products (i.e. the number of 
different parts in the filing system), it is difficult to state a 
general theorem. Experience suggests, however, that the number 
of distinct operations involved in sorting and matching items on 
a list (even by the most efficient method) increases as something 
like the square of the number of items on the list. From a 
purely combinatorial perspective, the number f(n) of number of 
possible scheduling schemes for n different parts, each of which 
can be made on m, different machines, at (i = 1 ,  . . .  n) different 
rates subject to various constraints, is almost beyond 
calculation when these numbers are large. At any rate, it is 
'But not by using an expensive machine for an operation that 
a cheaper one can perform just as well! 
safe to assert that 
f(n) > >  n 
Selection of the optimum schedule from among these f(n) 
possibilities by any known mathematical programming technique 
involves a number of mathematical operations g(n) of the order of 
That is, the number of mathematical operations required to 
compare and select the most efficient schedule option is of the 
order of the square of the number of such options. Th is number, 
in turn, is much larger than the number of different parts to be 
made. 
Another illustration of the complexity-related combinatorial 
explosion (and its implications) comes from the problem of 
assembly optimization. I t  has been shown CDeFazio & Whitney 831 
that, as the number of parts in the assembly increases, the 
number of possible ways of assembling them -- "parts trees" -- 
increases much faster than n, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 5. 
To be sure, many parts trees are physically unrealizable, but the 
only known method of optimization (to date) is to construct all 
possible parts trees and test them individually, for physical 
realizability by applying constraints such as contact and 
precedence conditions. 
6. Complexity and Manufacturing: The Monolithic Concept 
Until the 1960's, complexity of any machine could reasonably 
be measured in terms of its 'parts count', the number of 
components from which i t  was made. The few exceptions (such as 
solid stamped or forged wheels replacing spoked bicycle-type 
wheels) essentially prove the generality of the rule. This was as 
true for electrical machines as for mechanical devices. In 1958, 
J. A. Morton, Vice President of Bell Laboratories, wrote that 
scientists know in principle how to extend man's visual, tactile, 
and computational abilities by means of electronic circuitry, but 
that "such systems, because of their complex digital nature, 
require hundreds, thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands of 
electron devices.""" Morton called this the 'tyranny of 
numbers'. He pointed out that each electronic circuit element 
(resistor, capacitor, inductor, transistor, etc.) "must be made, 
tested, packed, shipped, unpacked, retested, and interconnected 
one-at-a-time to produce a whole system". Morton said, "The 
tyranny of large numbers sets up a numbers barrier to future 
advanc:es if we must rely on individual discrete components." 
Indeed, a circuit with 100,000 components could easily require 
L'.-'Quotes cited by T.R. Reid in "The Chip" Science 85, 
February 1985, page 35. 
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1,000,000 different soldered connections. The Control Data 
Corporations CDC 1604 Computer (1959) had 25,000 transistors 
100,000 diodes, and hundreds of thousands of resistors and 
capacitors (ibid). A navy destroyer at the time had 350,000 
district electronic components, with millions of soldered 
connections. 
This was the background for the monolithic revolution: the 
introduction of "integrated circuits" invented independently by 
J. Kilby of Texas Instruments Company, and Robert Noyce of 
Fairchild Semiconductor (1958-1959). Since then, waves of 
microminiaturization have compressed more and more circuit 
elements onto a single semiconductor chip. The latest 'chips' are 
almost unbelievable complex devices electronically, but the 
complexity is embodied in compositional non-uninformities. A 
'chip' is built up of patterned layers of insulators, conductors 
and semiconductors with carefully contrived properties. They are 
manufactured, incidently, by a kind of controlled "growth" 
process similar to the way a natural crystal grows: from the 
inside out. 
A similar trend in integration (to avoid the 'tyranny of 
numbers') is beginning to appear in the mechanical and 
electromechanical arena. To cite one example, the latest small 
IBM dot-matrix printer (introduced in 1985) involves only 60 
parts, as compared to 150 parts for comparable units built only 
two years earlier.ll Much of the reduction in parts number was 
achieved by using complex molded side frames to replace 20 other 
parts. Motors twist and lock into place, eliminating four bolts, 
four nuts, and four washers each. This greatly reduces the amount 
of assembly labor needed, as well as the probability of defects 
and need for inspection. Another example comes from Black & 
Decker Mfg. Co., the world's leading producer of electric hand 
tools. A comprehensive redesign and simplifciation of the entire 
product line resulted in dramatic savings in manufacturing cost. 
One can scarcely escape the conclusion that the next 
generation of household appliances and automobiles will have many 
fewer mechanical parts than the present generation of such 
products. Just as integration of electronic circuitry involved 
"growing" complex chips by adding successive layers and materials 
with different properties, so the manufacture of integrated 
mechanical devices may proceed in the future. One can easily 
envision a 'monolithic' chair, for instance, having rigid legs, 
springy seat and back, foam cushions and a velour or leather-like 
surface, entirely manufactured by adding successive layers to a 
molded substrate in a controlled fashion without any cutting or 
assembly of pieces. If chairs, then why not desks, tables, sofas, 
and beds? Moving parts introduce difficulties, but not 
necessarily insuperable ones. Ultimately, the number of 'parts' 
in a car might well drop into the low hundreds, as complex body 
and frame subassemblies are replaced by monolithic substitutes. 
Henry Ford considered his major contribution to manufacturing to 
be the elimination of "fitters". The next major revolution in 
manufacturing may be the (gradual) elimination of assembly. 
"Wall St. Journal, April 13, 1986. 
To be sure, the manufacturing of monolithic mechanical 
products analogous to the 'chip' would likely entail very complex 
multi-stage processes -- just as chip-making does. But 
increasingly sophisticated and predictable counter-pressure 
castinq/molding techniques and isostatic powder metallurgical 
techniques are beginning to emerge. Extensive pretesting can 
reduce intrinsic defect rates to almost arbitrarily low levels. 
A flaw once detected in the manufacturing system itself is 
eliminated once-for-all. Downstream inspection will largely be 
done by computer-assisted microscopy and thermoqraphy. A final 
bit of speculation: man will not fully conquer space until 
mono1 i thic construct ion techniques are adopted for space-ships. 
Until then, operational reliability will remain an elusive dream. 
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